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Biosecurity and Disease Management in China’s Animal Agriculture
Sector
Abstract
China’s livestock production sector is changing rapidly to meet a variety of challenges. At the same time,
China’s domestic consumers have begun to demand better quality and safer dietary protein sources; potential
for international food market penetration has been compromised by food scandals; and her animal agriculture
sector remains a concern for emergence of zoonotic diseases. The country is in the process of a major public
animal health infrastructure upgrade, and is seeking better integration with international public animal health
governance structures. The intent of this article is two-fold. We provide an overview of and commentary on
China’s animal husbandry sector and animal disease control policies. We also assess weaknesses in its animal
health and biosecurity infrastructure. China’s animal health administration countenances institutional
weaknesses that are shared with higher-income countries, but her problems are more pronounced.
Administrative failings include poorly demarcated and inconsistent oversight as well as failings in
accountability. The need for professionalization of animal health careers, emphasis on quantity goals over
qualitative metrics, as well as a want in scientific analysis and follow-through when prioritizing are other
weaknesses. Government policy has been to promote larger-scale production, primarily to better secure
wholesome food domestically. Production is changing in ways that may pose intermediate-term threats to
animal and human health, but the longer-term outcome may be a production base that poses fewer concerns
for global health.
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Biosecurity and Disease Management in China’s Animal Agriculture Sector 
Abstract: China’s livestock production sector is changing rapidly to meet a variety of challenges. 
At the same time, China’s domestic consumers have begun to demand better quality and safer 
dietary protein sources; potential for international food market penetration has been compromised 
by food scandals; and her animal agriculture sector remains a concern for emergence of zoonotic 
diseases. The country is in the process of a major public animal health infrastructure upgrade, and 
is seeking better integration with international public animal health governance structures. The 
intent of this article is two-fold. We provide an overview of and commentary on China’s animal 
husbandry sector and animal disease control policies. We also assess weaknesses in its animal 
health and biosecurity infrastructure. China’s animal health administration countenances 
institutional weaknesses that are shared with higher-income countries, but her problems are more 
pronounced. Administrative failings include poorly demarcated and inconsistent oversight as well 
as failings in accountability. The need for professionalization of animal health careers, emphasis 
on quantity goals over qualitative metrics, as well as a want in scientific analysis and 
follow-through when prioritizing are other weaknesses. Government policy has been to promote 
larger-scale production, primarily to better secure wholesome food domestically. Production is 
changing in ways that may pose intermediate-term threats to animal and human health, but the 
longer-term outcome may be a production base that poses fewer concerns for global health.  
 


















Biosecurity in China’s Animal Agriculture Sector 
Animal agriculture in Southern China, and Southeast Asia more generally, has long raised 
concerns about zoonotic implications, in part because of mixing between farmed species, 
humans and migratory birds (Shortridge, 1; Sonnberg et al., 2) and in part because of the 
popularity of live animal markets (Greger, 3; Sims et al., 4). China’s comparatively recent rapid 
economic development has, if anything, expanded these concerns. Many view transition from 
small-scale to large-scale animal production systems as a central driver of livestock and 
zoonotic diseases (Perry et al., 5; Bogich et al., 6), especially when linked with environmental 
change (Jones et al., 7), high population density (Jones et al., 8), stressed production support 
infrastructure and increasing movement of both animal and human populations. 
At the same time, food users have begun to insist on higher standards among China’s animal 
protein producers. An increasingly affluent and educated domestic market is demanding more 
wholesome food. Animal product safety events that were widely reported in the last decade 
have been many and varied. One of the most significant was melamine adulteration in pet food, 
circa 2007, and milk, circa 2008 (Sharma and Paradakar, 9). Illegal additives fed to pigs that 
passed through Shuanghui Group up to 2011, mercury in milk that passed through Yili Group in 
2012 and the mystery of thousands of dead farm animals floating down a Shanghai area river in 
2013 are other examples. Such events have highlighted weaknesses in China’s food production 
system. They have also shaped provisions in the United States FDA Food Safety Modernization 
Act of 2011 (Levitt and Pape, 10) that pose increased impediments to China’s food export 
potential (Broughton and Walker, 11). 
History relates similar events for other economies in rapid transition, especially when food 
chains extend to growing cities so that opportunistic middle agents can take advantage of poorly 
monitored links in a rapidly reorganizing food system (Collins, 12). Responses in Europe and 
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North America during the 19th and 20th Centuries came in part from the private sector through 
emphasis on accountability, product branding and food distribution system rationalization. In 
the public arena, responses came through strengthening fundamental science and the extension 
of consequent findings to investigate emerging problems. Stronger science also allowed for 
public and private sector measurement of product attributes to control quality directly and to 
support prudently designed regulations. 
Similar responses can be seen today in China (Gale and Hu, 13). Concerning melamine in 
milk, public outrage at and lost profits for companies associated with adulteration has made the 
industry recognize the need for deep-rooted change (Qian et al., 14). In 2013 Shuanghui made a 
bid for the largest U.S. pork producer and processor Smithfield, where a widely reported 
rationale for the deal was access to Smithfield’s brand quality and quality assurance capabilities 
(Bensinger and Hsu, 15). Far-ranging government policy responses to the suite of concerns have 
also occurred, including major regulatory reform and coordinated responses regarding food 
industry structure (Pei et al., 16; Jia et al., 17). It is now government policy to encourage larger, 
more standardized and vertically integrated production systems (Gale et al., 18). 
More broadly, the Chinese government’s approach to international cooperation and 
coordination regarding global health concerns has evolved in the past decade as the country has 
begun to accept and sought to shape its growing role in international governance of health and 
product safety (Lo, 19). The turning point occurred with the SARS epidemic in 2003, followed 
in 2004 by heightened concerns about Avian Influenza. Chinese authorities came to see that 
health anxieties could create social panic and destabilization (Morrison, 20; Wishnick, 21). 
Poverty and limited human health infrastructure in rural areas as well as increased mobility 
between urban and rural areas have exacerbated these concerns (Kaufman, 22). 
Through partnerships, personnel exchanges and participation in surveillance networks, 
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China has sought to share its experiences and better integrate with global preparedness and 
disease outbreak response efforts (Rambhia and Cicero, 23; Morse, 24), and has greatly 
strengthened its human health surveillance and reporting systems (Yang et al., 25). The People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) has taken full part in the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
activities since 2007. Comparatively few studies exist in the public domain for bioterrorism and 
biosecurity challenges that China faces (Huang, 26), although some work has sought to identify 
emerging weaknesses in training (Peng et al., 27). Our interest is in the state and evolution of 
China’s preparedness in the arena of farm animal biosecurity, where published studies are 
almost non-existent. Given the widely acknowledged need for a global perspective on health 
biosecurity and aforementioned particular concerns about the human-animal interface in China, 
this oversight requires attention. We intend to provide context and analysis on the matter.  
The paper proceeds with an overview of China’s livestock sector, followed by 
considerations of major diseases afflicting in the sector. We then outline China’s animal disease 
control administration and infrastructure. After explaining the country’s disease control policies, 
we address some weaknesses in the system. The paper concludes with a brief discussion. 
 
FARMED ANIMAL SECTOR 
China’s animal husbandry sector assumed a free market approach early after the shift toward 
reform and opening policies in China in 1978, and the sector has developed rapidly since then. 
Livestock sector gross output value reached 2.58 trillion Chinese Yuan (CY) in 2011, or about 
$416 billion US. Its share in total agricultural output value increased uniformly from 15% in 
1978 to 32% in 2011. China is now the world’s largest pork and poultry meat producer.1  
However, animal disease and related biosecurity issues are major constraints to the sector’s 
                                                              
1 The above data are from the China Statistic Yearbook of 2012 as published by the China 
National Statistics Bureau. 
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development. Direct economic losses each year caused by animal deaths due to disease are 
estimated to exceed 40 billion CY, while indirect economic losses (including waste of feedstuff, 
labor and drugs) are estimated to exceed 100 billion CY (Xia, 28). Avian Influenza alone in 
2004 triggered a loss of about 177 billion CY in domestic trade (Xie et al., 29), including as 
many as 1 million lost jobs (NDRC, 30). The spread of animal diseases also severely impacted 
public health and national security. As a result, in 2008 the Chinese Government decreed that 
the development of an improved animal disease control system should be expedited, 
investments in system development should be increased, and the compensation mechanism for 
animals culled due to major diseases should be improved.2  
Table 1 shows changes in production of the major farmed livestock species between 1985 
and 2011. Pig and poultry production in China has grown rapidly over the past 27 years, with 
the number of marketed hogs increasing nearly three-fold and the number of marketed poultry 
increasing seven-fold over the period. Rate of growth in pig production has slowed since about 
2000, in some part due to rising costs and low technical efficiency (Xiao et al., 31). Although 
traditionally located along the Yangtze River, see Figure 1, limited access to feed has meant that 
this region’s hog production share has declined from about 64% to about 40% between 1980 
and 2009 (Xiao et al., 31), with some production relocating to the North and Southeast where 
imported soybean is easier to obtain.  
Since 2007, government policy has emphasized a more industrialized and integrated format, 
with eventual exit by smaller producers. Hog production policies have included grants for 
genetic improvement and operation enlargement as well as subsidized insurance and a subsidy 
per sow (Chen and Wang, 32). The trend toward larger production units is likely to continue. 
                                                              
2 Several opinions of the Central Party Committee and the State Council on Constructing 




Large farms can better substitute machines for China’s increasingly expensive labor, can pay to 
access better genetics, and likely can better work with downstream processors concerned about 
quality issues. Government policy also extends to disease management. It is compulsory to 
immunize pigs against classical swine fever (CSF), Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory 
Syndrome (PRRS), and Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) but vaccines are heavily subsidized 
(Gale et al., 18). Compensation is provided for pigs that must be removed for disease 
management purposes while dead animal disposal costs are borne by local government. 
The share of poultry meat in all China’s meat production has increased from 8% in 1985 to 
21% in 2009 (Zhou et al., 33), reflecting impressive penetration into the country’s diet. Per 
capita consumption of broiler meat now exceeds 9 Kg/year while it is about 3 Kg/year and 1 
Kg/year for duck and goose meat, respectively. Poultry production occurs throughout China 
although most broiler production occurs in the coastal provinces of Shandong, Guangdong, 
Jiangsu and Liaoning while duck and geese production are somewhat regionally concentrated in 
the inland Sichuan Basin (Prosser et al., 34). The continued importance of the live trade is 
reflected in production pockets around large cities. China is by far the world’s largest egg 
producer with 2.7 billion laying hens.3 Egg laying has seen some relocation from North China, 
around Shandong and Hebei Provinces, toward the South while the egg production chain has 
become more specialized (Han, 35). The sector continues to be vulnerable to disease. Following 
culling losses, market closures and reduced demand arising from the H7N9 bird flu events of 
April 2013, the government sought to stave off bankruptcies through direct handouts and 
subsidized loans to poultry breeders and processors. 
Ruminant production has increased, but at a slower and more variable rate over the period 
than has been the case with pigs and poultry. China has not had a strong tradition in milk or beef 
                                                              




production or consumption. However, demand for dairy products has expanded with the 
country’s increasing prosperity and awareness of bodily needs for calcium and protein balance. 
Demand has been met by imports and domestic production, with a strong government 
preference for domestic production. In 2011 the country had 7.6 million dairy cows located 
mainly in the North, just south of Beijing, and the Northeastern provinces (Figure 1). Farms 
have been small, with average cow inventory at five in 2002, see Table 2. The melamine scandal 
was a fundamental shock to the sector, strengthening preferences for imports.  
In response, the government sought structural remedies (Dobson et al., 36) as codified in the 
Dairy Industry Policy Revision of 2009. Similar to hog sector policy revisions, subsidies were 
provided for promoting the genetic contribution to productivity through animal and semen 
imports. Vertical integration is being encouraged, in part so that milk production can be better 
monitored by processors and by the authorities. In particular ‘cow hotels’ are supported where 
small producers and their cows would relocate to centralized facilities in which resources could 
be shared and technology transfer could presumably occur more rapidly (Mo et al., 37). 
International investment that fosters consolidation and best management practices in domestic 
production are also encouraged. As for other animal products, drivers for these changes have 
been concerns about food security and quality assurance. Adulteration and other quality 
concerns have been central motivations for the policy push, while animal and zoonotic disease 
concerns are barely mentioned. One wonders about how the prevalence of brucellosis, bovine 
tuberculosis and Johne’s disease have been affected by cow hotels? 
Over the past 30 years, unit scale of production on China’s livestock farms has increased 
significantly and large-scale animal farmers have gradually replaced small holders. The number 
of farm households has decreased while the amounts of all kinds of livestock have increased. 
Table 2 shows changes in average farm size over time for major farmed livestock species. 
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Animal husbandry is very important to China’s agricultural economy and farmers’ income. The 
sector’s output value increased six-fold in real value between 1985 and 2011 while its share in 
total agricultural production value increased from 22.0% in 1985 to 31.7% in 2011, see Table 3. 
However, income from animal husbandry as a share of total net income from agriculture has 
remained at about 20% between 1991 and 2011. Income per unit output has declined, reflecting 
financial stress among those small-scale farmers that remain in production. Table 3 also shows 
that the proportion of income derived from animal husbandry in total net income to farm 
households has dropped markedly between 1991 and 2011. This is mainly because income to 
farm households from non-farming sectors has increased over time, reflecting rural migration 
and local off-farm labor.  
 
OCCURRENCE OF MAJOR ANIMAL DISEASES 
Perhaps because of trade isolation for much of the 20th Century, China has had a comparatively 
good record on many globally problematic animal diseases. For example, China has never had a 
confirmed case of scrapie, bovine spongiform encephalopathy, African horse sickness, African 
swine fever, vesicular stomatitis, lumpy skin disease or rift valley fever.4 However, there is 
much internal trade in livestock and livestock products. Given the state of infrastructure, it 
should be no surprise that major animal diseases have frequently broken out and spread. These 
include FMD in cattle, pigs and sheep after 1999, the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 
pandemic since 2004, the streptococcus suis outbreak in Sichuan in 2005, and the swine 
PRRS-like outbreak in 2006. According to estimates (Xiong and Xu, 38), the annual death rate 
due to various diseases is about 8-12% among pigs, 12-20% among poultry, 2-5% among cattle, 
and 7-9% among sheep where about half of these are attributable to contagious and parasite 
                                                              




 In some cases China’s animal disease control management has performed well historically. 
For example management controls for animal brucellosis, which can significantly reduce 
productivity, have been in place since 1952 (Shang et al., 39). An important zoonotic disease, 
humans can contract it from pigs, cattle or sheep but contagion among humans is rare. The 
disease is most prevalent in the pastoral north, in areas bordering Mongolia and Russia (Chen et 
al., 40), and reported human incidence has grown from 0.7 notifications per 100,000 per year in 
the 1990s to about 10 since 2005. Controls appear to have been quite effective until about 1980. 
Controls have involved testing and slaughter as well as quarantine at international borders. 
Animal and human vaccination has been in place as a strategy since the 1950s and seems to 
have been the reason for decline in prevalence through to the 1980s. Since 1980, some 
provinces have conducted human and animal surveillance while animal movement controls 
have become more stringent since implementation of animal quarantine regulations after 1997. 
China had for many years adopted strict measures to keep animal epidemics confidential. 
Thus it is difficult to assess the historical extent of disease control and management efficacy. 
Since the early 1980s information on most, but by no means all, animal epidemics has been 
made public. Due to concerns about poor transparency regarding animal diseases, many 
countries continue to bar livestock product imports from China (Zhao, 41). The official channel 
for disclosing epidemic diseases in China is the Veterinary Bulletin of the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MoA). Initiated in 1999, the Bulletin discloses monthly the occurrence of major 
animal diseases in China. Table 4 presents nationwide data reported in the Bulletin on the 
number of cases of six major diseases nationwide during 2000-’11. Five of these are Class A 
animal diseases in China while brucellosis is a Class A human disease.5  
                                                              
5 These six diseases are all OIE notifiable. According to List of Class A, B and C Animal 
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The table shows that Newcastle disease (among poultry) and Classical Swine Fever have 
been the two most common. In recent years Newcastle disease outbreaks have been effectively 
controlled. Incidence has declined subsequent to the implementation of vaccination measures. 
Commencing 2008 the incidences of Classical Swine Fever and PRRS, which are also included 
in the nationwide compulsory vaccination policy, have declined markedly.  
The years 2003-2004 saw a major outbreak and spread of H5N1 avian influenza throughout 
Southeast Asia. In 2005 alone, in excess of 160,000 birds were infected in China. Prevalence 
decreased after the PRC implementing comprehensive prevention and control measures 
including compulsory vaccination, culling, disinfection, movement controls and surveillance, 
but the outbreak was not fully controlled until 2009. Among the six diseases, brucellosis and 
FMD have yet to be brought under effective control. When compared with 2000, the number of 
brucellosis cases was 11 times higher in 2010. In 2011, records identify a severe brucellosis 
breakdown among cattle and sheep in pastoral Inner Mongolia. FMD broke out in the summer 
of 2006 and again in the first half of 2010 in China. In summary, even though China continues 
to face significant animal disease challenges, its government has sought to strengthened animal 
disease control and this is reflected in successes against several major diseases.6  
 
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
China is firmly committed to developing a comprehensive veterinary regulatory and legal 
system, see Table 5. The PRC’s fundamental law on Animal Disease Prevention took effect after 
State Council regulations were formulated in 1997, and a major amendment took effect in 2008. 
It sets down explicit provisions on various aspects, including reporting, notification and release 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Diseases, which was promulgated by MoA in December 2008, Class A animal diseases are of 
greatest impact and importance. 
6 Before 2006 China did not disclose complete information concerning FMD (Zhao, 41), so 
data reported in the Veterinary Bulletin may be misleading. 
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of animal disease information, control and eradication of animal diseases, inspection of animals 
and animal products, diagnosis and treatment of animals, and administration of animal disease 
prevention measures. On the basis of this law, the State Council established rules and plans for 
emergency response management, regulations over animal and plant entry and exit quarantine 
as well as many other domains (Xiang and Wang, 42; Veterinary Bureau MoA, 43). The MoA’s 
Veterinary Bureau (VB) has formulated supportive rules for many activities, such as disease 
reporting, management of veterinary drugs, emergency response management, veterinarian 
management, bio-safety management for veterinary laboratories, surveillance and early warning, 
as well as inspection and supervision. 
Since 2004, China has developed emergency response plans such as the nationwide 
emergency response plan for the prevention and control of HPAI. In 2010, an emergency 
response plan for control of FMD was issued. Meanwhile, emergency response plans for major 
animal diseases have been developed at provincial, municipal and county levels, covering their 
respective administrative areas (VB MoA, 44). 
Figure 2 outlines China’s institutional system for animal disease control. The MoA is the 
national authority in charge of organizing and supervising national animal disease prevention 
and control work, publicizing animal disease information, mobilizing stamp-out activities, 
veterinary drug control and inspection work, and overseeing public and private sector 
veterinarians. The Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) is located in the MoA’s Veterinary Bureau 
and is in charge of veterinary administration across the country. Veterinary authorities have been 
established in every province, prefecture and county for animal disease control, inspection and 
quarantine, veterinary drug administration and residue control as well as other duties within 
their respective jurisdictions. In 2011, veterinary administrative agency employment across 
province, prefecture and national levels summed to 34,000 (VB MoA, 44). 
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Local governments at the county-level or above have also established animal health 
supervision institutions. They are responsible for disease inspection of livestock and livestock 
products, as well as administration and law enforcement related to animal disease prevention. In 
2011, aggregate employment at these institutions was 149,000 (VB MoA, 44). 
In addition, China has established veterinary technical support institutions at various levels. 
Country-level veterinary technical support institutions include three public institutes directly 
affiliated to the MoA. These are i) China Animal Disease Control Center which is responsible 
for surveillance and control; ii) China Institute of Veterinary Drug Control which is charged 
with assessing drug quality and regulating use; iii) China Animal Health & Epidemiology 
Center which investigates specific outbreaks and more generally seeks to identify risk factors. 
Country-level laboratories include dedicated national diagnostic and reference laboratories for 
each of AI, FMD, Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), Classical swine fever, Newcastle 
disease and Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia.7 The MoA has also set up 304 national 
animal disease surveillance and reporting stations to undertake surveillance and epidemiological 
investigation assignments from MoA or provincial veterinary authorities. The 146 border animal 
disease surveillance stations carry out similar duties along border regions.  
Local animal disease control institutions are also in place. Provinces, municipalities and 
counties have their own animal disease control institutions for disease prevention, control and 
eradication as well as surveillance, testing, epidemiological investigation and reporting within 
their jurisdiction. Finally, county veterinary authorities supervise offices at town and township 
levels. They are responsible for disease prevention, inspection, and technical extension services. 
The General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) is 
responsible for inspection and quarantine of animals and animal products that enter and exit the 
                                                              
7 Diseases outbreaks are be confirmed by the pertinent reference laboratory and information is 
then released by the government. All reference laboratories are Biosafety level 3 (BSL3). 
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PRC. AQSIQ exercises vertical management over its entry and exit inspection and quarantine 
institutions. AQSIQ supervises 35 entry and exit inspection and quarantine bureaus directly 
under it in all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities as well as at major ports. There 
are nearly 300 branches and over 200 offices at seaports, land ports and airports as well as 
shipment distribution centers, with total staffs of more than 30,000 (VB MoA, 44). 
  
ANIMAL DISEASE CONTROL POLICY  
Approaches to control 
In line with the National Long and Middle-term Animal Disease Control Plan for 2012-2020, 
the general approach across major diseases is that infectious animal disease control in China 
advance from blanket vaccination to near disease-free with vaccination and, relying on 1997 
quarantine regulations, from there to disease-free without vaccination. In terms of scope of 
control, it is intended that a regionalized approach to endemic disease control will be followed 
for diseases where such an approach is practical. Commencing with disease-free regions, the 
intent is to expand geographically toward disease-free at the national level (State Council, 45). 
Heavy reliance on vaccination can be problematic for many diseases, including FMD. Multiple 
FMD virus variants exist where vaccines are not effective across all. Distinguishing between a 
vaccinated animal and an infected animal can be difficult and can lead to problems when 
identifying and managing an outbreak. Furthermore, outbreaks have likely occurred during the 
course of vaccine development (Li and Lui, 46; Hui and Leung, 47). Blanket vaccination is not 
widely applied for many major diseases in OECD countries because it can diminish quality of 
test information. Most OECD countries do apply herd lock up and regional movement control 
strategies when seeking to eradicate a disease. 
The PRC is committed to sharing information on animal health events across various 
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governmental levels, and with international organizations such as OIE and WHO. Its disease 
surveillance and reporting system and the outbreak response system are depicted in Figures 3 
and 4, respectively (VB MoA, 48). For zoonotic diseases, the national government’s focus 
includes Brucellosis, Bovine Tuberculosis, Schistosomiasis (a parasite), Coenurosis (a parasitic 
infection) and rabies. Regarding foreign animal diseases, the MoA cooperates closely with 
related agencies to strengthen border controls and foreign animal disease surveillance. The 
government also cooperates across national borders in prevention and control measures, where 
instances include control programs for African Swine Fever and Peste de Petits Ruminants 
(PPR). The MoA is also placing emphasis on training in emergency response and preparedness 
of emergency response (VB MoA, 43).  
Financial support policy 
Since 2005, funding needed for veterinary administration, animal health supervision, disease 
prevention and control institutions and township veterinary stations has been incorporated into 
government budgets at corresponding administrative levels (Xiang and Wang, 42). The National 
Animal Disease Control System Development Plan (2004-2008) was supported by 4.5 billion 
CNY from central government finances. Plan priorities were two-fold. One was to speed up 
construction projects that support central animal disease prevention and control infrastructure, 
and also technological transformation of biological products enterprises. The second was to 
strengthen the presence and effectiveness of local veterinary stations. Some of the funds were 
used to build animal disease prevention systems, infrastructure for quarantine and monitoring, 
and controls on drug quality and residues at central, provincial, county and township levels.  
Financial support for veterinary medicine can be summarized as a ‘three policies’ approach 
(Wei et al., 49; Sun, 50) as laid out below. These policies have facilitated the implementation of 
compulsory vaccination and culling through reducing resistance by farmers and through 
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stabilizing the local animal disease control infrastructure. The policies are: 
(1) Financial assistance for compulsory animal vaccination: The central government 
provides financial assistance for compulsory vaccination against four major animal diseases. 
China has implemented compulsory vaccination against FMD since 2001, AI since 2005, 
Highly Pathogenic PRRS (HP-PPRS) since 2007 and swine fever since 2007. These 
vaccinations are preventive, rather than as part of an emergency response strategy. 
(2) Compensation for compulsory culling: compulsory culling is implemented for 
livestock infected by HPAI, FMD, HP-PRRS and PPR, as well as dairy cows that test positive 
for brucellosis and tuberculosis. Some monetary compensation, but generally considerably 
below market price, is provided to owners. 
(3) Central government financial support for local animal disease control: In 2001 the 
MoA and the Ministry of Finance jointly agreed to increase support for compulsory 
vaccinations carried out by local animal disease control workers. In 2008 the central 
government commenced providing financial support for more general animal disease control at 
the local veterinary station level. Through procurement of labor services, the country in total 
recruited 645,000 village animal disease control workers who vaccinate, tag livestock, establish 
vaccination records and report animal diseases. These activities are partly paid for through a 650 
million CNY government allocation. In addition, local government finances provide matching 
support for village disease control workers.  
 
ISSUES FOR ANIMAL DISEASE MANAGEMENT 
Animal disease control programs in China are intended to first establish effective disease 
control and eradication. But these are not the only goals that China’s public animal health 
administration seeks to address. As is the case with many other countries, a fundamental change 
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in the mission of China’s veterinary medicine profession is taking place. A primary focus on 
cheap protein is being replaced by a broader view that also includes animal well-being, food 
safety and public goods in line with evolving commercial contracts, international standards and 
domestic civic concerns. Consistent with its rapid growth and increasing presence in 
international food markets, China’s imperative to upgrade public animal health infrastructure 
has been far stronger than for most countries. Outlined below are some specific areas where 
China’s veterinary service and animal disease control system seems to be particularly weak.  
 
Issues related to administration  
The veterinary administration reforms initiated in 2005 were limited. Although the reform 
largely resolved institutional issues, there remain many weaknesses. Comments A)-D) below 
rely heavily on critiques by Sun (50) and also Xiang and Wang (42): 
A) Unclear domains of administrative jurisdiction: At present, although the MoA is 
assigned responsibility for veterinary administration, in practice some authority lies with 
agencies not overseen by MoA. Control of disease among wild animals is under the National 
Forestry Bureau, while farmed and legally hunted animals are the remit of MoA. Border 
controls for animals and animal products are the responsibility of AQSIQ. Supervision of 
animal health and animal products, animal husbandry and transportation are administered by 
MoA. Slaughter and processing are also MoA responsibilities while industry development 
planning, industry standards and industry supervision are overseen by the Ministry of 
Commerce. Once meat products enter the market, the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce assumes responsibility. When meat products entered the catering sector, supervision 
becomes the responsibility of public health authorities.  
However, in practice demarcation of responsibilities is unclear and some stages fall between 
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the cracks. Ill-defined boundaries of control may lead to wasted resources when bureaucracies 
contest for control as well as when seeking to deflect accountability in the aftermath of a crisis. 
Similar inconsistencies exist elsewhere, as in the United States where the federal Department of 
Agriculture is responsible for meat, poultry and processed egg food safety but the federal Food 
and Drug Administration is responsible for the safety of most other foods. However, concerns 
about communication failures should be more acute for a rapidly developing country with 
comparably brisk marketing chain reconfigurations.  
B) Domestic and border quarantine activities are separated and policies are issued by 
multiple government agencies: In 1998, and in compliance with State Council regulations, 
China’s internal and external quarantine activities were separated. Entry and exit quarantine for 
plants and animals, formerly administered by the MoA, were handed over to the newly 
established AQSIQ and responsibilities for wildlife protection were handed over to the National 
Forestry Bureau. Consolidating supervision at borders mitigates many other problems. However, 
as with unclear administrative jurisdiction in item A) above, failures in coordination and 
accountability, inter-agency disputes and gaps in administrative oversight are frequent. 
 C) Loss of institutional focus and conflicts of interest. China’s current veterinary 
administration does not effectively separate public functions and profit-driven activities. For 
example, the availability of public financial resources remain very limited at the local level. 
Partly as a result, and in order to support obligatory public animal disease management 
activities, veterinary administrators engage in cost recovery and profit-making activities. These 
include disease diagnosis and treatment as well as feedstuff and drugs sales. Retailing to 
producers that are also supervised leads to conflicts of interest.  
 D) Quality assessment needs further improvement. Quality assessment procedures have 
never been adequately developed and implemented for China’s veterinary administration units. 
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Assessment indicators are often non-specific while those that are typically emphasize 
infrastructure construction. By contrast with management practices in other countries, 
procedures to measure progress, assemble informative data and objectively compare alternative 
approaches have generally not been put in place. For example, in prevention and control of 
major animal diseases the only data that have been collected are indicators of success in 
vaccination coverage. Other useful data, such as costs by farm, are not generally collected.8 
 
Issues related to legal safeguards and human capital  
E) Absence of basic laws on licensing: A document issued by the State Council of China in 
2005 made clear that an official system of licensing and oversight for the veterinary profession 
is to be developed. To this end, in 2009 the MoA commenced developing exam protocols for 
obtaining the qualification (see Table 5). However, basic laws on veterinary licensing are not in 
place so that professional responsibilities and scope of work have yet to be defined. It is also 
difficult to preclude entry by those that are not well-qualified. Thus, incentives are weak for 
practitioners to invest in professional growth or to specialize. In addition, the government does 
not have available to it advice from a well-motivated professional body concerned with 
advancing the vocation’s performance and contribution to society.  
F) Regulatory omissions and inconsistent implementation: China relies on government 
departments to promote the formulation and amendment of laws and regulations. But agendas 
differ and inter-departmental conflict is common. In some cases, political considerations 
supersede the integrity of laws while in other cases no law applies. For example, wild animal 
disease prevention and control is not covered by any law. This has been problematic for HPAI 
                                                              
8 The OIE tool for the evaluation of Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) is newly 
introduced into the PRC. Presently an imperfect data collection network is in place at the local 
level and insufficient funds have been allocated for data collection.  
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control. Furthermore several general problems likely affect issue identification and definition. 
One is weakness in the veterinary profession, as outlined in item E) above. Another is limited 
opportunities for public discourse, whether because of concerns about conflict with 
administration or because of limited education on the part of many farmers. 
G) Accountability systems are not well established: In prevention and control of major 
animal diseases, responsibility lies to some extent with administrators responsible for 
processing the initial report. As a result, the official may not have strong incentives to act in the 
public good. False, inadequate and delayed reports occur from time to time (Wei, 51). Missing 
are implemented procedures for more discerning information gathering, auditing and personnel 
management that might encourage officials to report problems when found.  
H) Local animal disease control workforce quality needs upgrading: In 2009 China had 
645,000 village animal disease control workers. Non-veterinary personnel accounted for 63.5% 
of these while personnel with less than middle school education accounted for 35.2%. In general, 
local disease control workers have had insufficient training to meet job requirements. Some 
village disease control workers have limited knowledge about pertinent scientific principles, 
specific animal diseases and their modes of transmission. Detection and reporting delays as well 
as misdiagnosis are all too frequent, leading to disease spread and inefficient use of scarce 
public animal health resources. 
 
Issues related to financial support 
I) Low levels of gross financial support: In recent years, public sector financial inputs into 
animal disease control in China have accounted for less than 0.2% of gross output value from 
animal husbandry. This is lower than in the United States, at about 0.6%, or Switzerland, at 
about 0.53% (Wei, 51). Expenditures on veterinary measures for each livestock unit [one 
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livestock unit equals to 1 bovine (adult), 4 pigs, 10 sheep or 100 chickens] are as high as 21 
USD in Switzerland and are 5 USD in the United States, compared with 1.6 USD in China (Wei, 
51). The disparity could be for a variety of reasons. China’s animal species mix is less 
concentrated on ruminants than countries in Western Europe and North America. Labor costs 
differ too. Animal productivity is comparatively higher in these other countries while it is 
arguable whether public animal health input productivity is higher elsewhere. But the numbers 
do suggest that if China strengthens its performance in providing public animal health inputs 
then increased investment into the area might be warranted. 
J) Inertia in disease control resource allocations: Three diseases have accounted for the 
large majority of central fiscal expenditures over the past 10 years. FMD control has accounted 
for about 50% of total expenditures, followed by AI at 29% and HP-PRRS at 15%, with 6% 
allocated to all other diseases. Investment in the control of other diseases has not increased for 
many years. For example, annual expenditures on screening and treatment of livestock 
Schistosomiasis, a zoonotic disease, has remained at 5 million CNY annually from 2003 to 2010, 
while expenditures on testing for brucellosis and equine infectious anaemia has been static in 
nominal terms since before 1990 (Wei et al., 49).  
K) Irrational allocation of expenditures: At present, China implements compulsory 
vaccination against four major animal diseases. Earmarked funding from central finance for 
animal disease prevention and control focuses largely on vaccine subsidies, which account for 
over 92% of category expenditures. Compensation for culling, disease outbreak surveillance, 
livestock product safety, health supervision, and approval of veterinary drugs are major 
components of the remainder (Wei et al., 52). Typically the final stages of disease containment 
and control require movement controls, culling and significant compensation budgets. Despite 
glaring weaknesses, disease outbreak surveillance and capacity building at the local level 
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through personnel training and technological extension receive little attention. As with item J) 
above, effective procedures for risk and vulnerability assessment do not appear to be in place.  
L) Low compensation for culling and farmer noncompliance: Under current animal loss 
compensation standards, compensation to farmers is much lower than market value. Net 
compensation for culled beef cattle and dairy cows are 1,200 and 2,400 CNY/head, respectively, 
compared with average market prices of about 7,000 and over 10,000 CNY/head, respectively, 
for beef cattle and dairy cows (Wei et al., 52). It should be no surprise that veterinary authorities 
continue to have difficulty in eliciting farmers to self-report and otherwise comply with disease 
control activities. In addition, some animals suffer severe adverse reactions to a vaccine (Sun, 
50) while no insurance scheme covers this risk. Motivated by concerns about productivity side 
effects, some farmers manage to avoid the vaccination mandate. 
M) Capital investments not matched with operational support: As is common through 
many other parts of the public sector in China and elsewhere, allocations to public animal health 
often focus on putting infrastructure in place rather than on maintenance or supporting the 
programs intended for the infrastructure.9 Recurrent costs for maintenance generally have to be 
raised by local governments, which is difficult for China’s less developed western regions. 
Consequently infrastructure is poorly maintained and ineffective in these regions. Some local 
laboratories are unable to use their facilities when fulfilling their surveillance and survey 
obligations, dispatching instead their samples for analysis at other institutes. 
 
General issues 
N) Further investment needs in diagnosis and allied epidemiology capabilities: While 
China’s human health disease detection infrastructure has improved markedly in recent years, 
                                                              
9 This concern was also raised as Conclusion 7 in the U.S. National Academies report on 
replacing Plum Island (McElwain et al., 53). 
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many analysts hold that important gaps remain. Infrastructure in place is largely for identifying 
syndromes via public health monitoring, but capability to diagnose the responsible pathogens is 
limited (Feng et al., 54). Given limited abilities to deal with biological samples, surveillance 
signals are noisy while ex-post epidemiology is poorly informed. Such capabilities will likely 
first emerge in human medicine before translating to animal health. Public health authorities 
have come to realize that particular weakness exists in this area and, more generally, that public 
animal health and human health activities need to be better integrated (Fearnley et al., 55). A 
response has been interdisciplinary One Health initiatives in China, commencing about 2012, 
including extensive veterinary epidemiology training courses. Similar to item M) above, 
capacity development needs to be supported with a commitment to subsequent investments in 
maintenance and operational support.  
O) Insufficient knowledge of produce origin and on-farm practices: Smaller-scale 
agricultural production persist in part because they are flexible in managing labor inputs and 
utilizing a wide array of feedstuffs. Governments have a reasonable interest in understanding 
how agricultural production practices affect food quality and biosecurity. Their capacity to 
understand is impeded to the extent that the production base is comprised of small, spatially 
dispersed and heterogeneous firms whose produce is not readily traced. Thus, melamine 
adulteration and use of illegal additives can go undetected for an extended period because this is 
not the practice of all firms and even if produce is found to be defective it is difficult to identify 
the source. Regulators have limited ability to relate cause with effect. There are therefore public 
needs for capacity to associate produce with producing farm, and to obtain structured 
information about what happens on farms. 
In recent decades, European and North American food processors have sought to protect 
their reputations for product quality by strengthening information flows from and control over 
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the farms they procure from (Pouliot and Sumner, 56). While altered contractual relations may 
better protect firms and consumers, more is needed to ensure that any regulatory interventions 
are prudent. Governments have sought to obtain relevant information in a variety of ways. 
Through NAHMS surveys sent out to growers since 1983, the U.S. Federal government has 
sought to better understand production practices as they relate to animal health. ARMS surveys, 
sent out to growers since 1996, serve more general purposes but have also been called upon to 
obtain baseline understandings of on-farm antibiotics use (Key and McBride, 57). Comparable 
structured information gathering endeavors do not exist in China. Production statistics for 
poultry are particularly unreliable, where large discrepancies between official statistics and 
vaccines used confound vaccine subsidy management. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Periods of rapid industry change almost invariably give rise to concerns about system failure. 
Teething problems may arise when firms learn about new technologies used in new contexts. 
The mindset suited to the approach being supplanted may not fit the novel approach and a 
workforce that cannot adapt may need to be replaced if the new approach is to work. In addition, 
system change-over will involve a protracted period when industry participants are very 
heterogeneous. During this time the industry may prove difficult to monitor and regulate. There 
may also be market mediated consequences of change-over. China’s melamine adulteration 
system failure was likely due in part to the profit squeeze faced by small producers when the 
advent of larger-scale production pushed milk prices down (Yu, 58).  
 A separate issue is whether a system of larger-scale production is safer than one of 
smaller-scale production. This is a complex and multi-faceted matter. It is clear that many 
consider larger-scale production to pose the greater risk (pp. 321-322 in Greger, 59; Graham et 
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al., 60), seeing larger farms as venues for huge virus loads to grow and adapt. Things may not 
be so simple, however. Many biosecurity measures are cheaper per unit animal when 
implemented on larger farms so that larger facilities can better justify investments in these 
measures (Sims, 61; Hennessy and Wang, 62). In addition, although confined animals may have 
less robust immune systems by contrast with backyard production, species are segregated from 
other domestic species and wild members of their own species. 
Perhaps the largest effect that China’s development will have on the health risks its 
livestock sector poses will arise from the infrastructure that growing wealth can eventually 
support. The London of Dickens was foul with disease not so much because of overcrowding, 
but because of inadequate sanitary infrastructure. Potable water and contained sewage systems 
deny germs the opportunity to spread while demand for live birds would decline were 
infrastructure sufficient to ensure that wholesome processed animals reach the consumer. 
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Table 1. Change in production of major livestock species in China, 1985-2011 (million head)  
Year 1985 1991 2001 2011 Average annual growth rate
Marketed poultry 1,5791/ 2,824 8,088 11,327 8.20%
Marketed pigs 237 329 549 662 4.02%
Stock of cattle 86.8 104.6 128.2 103.6 0.68%
Stock of sheep 155.9 206.2 298.3 282.4 2.31%
1/: data for 1986.  
Data source: marketed volume of poultry from 1986 to 2010 is from the China Animal Industry 









Table 2. Changes of average farm size of major livestock species, 2002-2010 (head per farm or 
household) 
Year 2002 2007 2010 
Marketed broilers 99.2 249.2 378.1 
Stock of egg layers 39.9 82.5 127.6 
Marketed pigs  5.8 6.9 10.8 
Marketed beef cattle 3.1 3.6 4.4 
Stock of dairy cattle 5.0 5.6 6.1 










Table 3. Importance of animal husbandry in China’s economy 
Year 1985 1991 2001 2011
Gross production value of animal 
husbandry (100 million CNY) 
797 2,159 7,963 25,771
Income from animal husbandry as share of 
total value of agricultural output 
0.22 0.265 0.304 0.317
Total value of international trade in meats 
(million USD)  
299 659 2,062 4,484
Income from animal husbandry as share of 
net farm household income 
/ 0.133 0.090 0.066
Income from animal husbandry as share of 
net income derived from agriculture 
/ 0.204 0.182 0.184
/: data unavailable for that year. 
Data sources: China Rural Statistic Yearbook (over years); of which, “Total international trade 
value of meats” is from China Foreign Economic and Trade Yearbook (several years) and now 








Table 4. Occurrences of major animal diseases in China: 2000-2011 (Units: head) 
 
Year /Disease AI FMD Swine fever PRRS Newcastle disease Brucellosis
2000 0 0 42,121 3,182 1,963,504 678
2001 0 0 34,149 208 744,218 0
2002 0 0 98,038 0 2,077,262 0
2003 0 0 75,934 6,280 1,144,480 662
2004 132,099 0 40,002 10,199 439,349 1,622
2005 161,183 536 82,446 28,234 1,402,563 2,154
2006 93,531 836 69,691 114,048 1,195,795 2,031
2007 27,160 151 148,007 96,933 646,049 1,247
2008 9,428 123 60,571 7,410 596,907 3,138
2009 2,951 813 39,277 6,885 302,173 4,676
2010 0 3,943 9,562 17,191 155,906 7,715
2011 290 823 4,535 1,069 46,338 124,730




Table 5. China’s Veterinary Laws and Regulations, and Dates they Came into Effect 
LAWS AND BROADLY APPLIED REGULATIONS 
Category Name Effective
Law 
PRC Law PRC on Entry and Exit Ani. and Plant Quar. 1992 
PRC Law on Agric. Product Quality and Safety 2006 
PRC Law on Ani. Production 2006 




Regs on Implementation of PRC Law on Entry and Exit Ani. & 
Plant Quar. 
1997 
Regs on Admin. of Veter. Drugs 2004 
Regs on Bio-safety Manage. of Pathogenic Microbe Labs 2004 





Admin. Meas. for Ani. Dis. Reporting 1999 
Rules on Manage. of Nat. Ani. Dis. Surveillance & Reporting 
System (Trial) 
2002 
List of Category A, B and C Ani. Dis. 2008 
List of Zoonoses 2009 
Emergency 
responses 
Nat. Conting. Plan for HPAI 2004 
Conting. Plan for Entry and Exit of Major Ani. Dis. 2005 
Conting. Plan of Agric. Authorities for Human Cases of HPAI 2005 
Nat. Conting. Plan for Sudden Outbreaks of Major Ani. Dis. 2006 
Conting. Plan for Prevention and Control of PPR 2010 





List of Veter. Categories of Ani. Pathogenic Microbes 2005 
Meas. for Examination and Approval of Bio-safety Manage. of 
Highly Pathogenic Ani. Pathogenic Microbe Laboratories 
2005 






Admin. Meas. for Highway Ani. Dis. Insp. Stations 2006 
Meas. for Manage. of Ani. Id. & Ani. Farming Records 2006 
Evaluation Meas. for Specific Ani. Dis. Free Zones 2007 
Admin. Meas. for Ani. Inspection  2010 




Regs on Sampling for Quality Supervision of Veter. drugs 2001 
Norms for Manage. of Veter. drug Production and Quality 2002 
Admin. Meas. for Veter. drugs Approval Document Numbers 2005 
Meas. for Registration of Veter. drugs 2005 
Admin. Meas. for Development of New Veter. drugs 2005 
Admin. Meas. for Ani. Bio-products 2007 
Admin. Meas. for Imported Veter. drugs 2008 
Insp. & Acceptance Meas. for Quality Manage. Standards in 2010 
31 
 
Production of Veter. drugs 
Norms for Business Operation & Quality Manage. of Veter. drugs 2010 
Admin. Meas. for Labels & Instructions of Veter. drugs 2010 
Veterinarian 
oversight 
Admin. Meas. for Ani. Clinics 2009 
Admin. Meas. on Licensed Veter. 2009 
Admin. Meas. on Rural Veter. 2009 





Technical Norms for Prevention & Control of Rabies 2006 
Technical Norms for Prevention & Control of 15 Ani. Dis., 
including HPAI, FMD, EIA, Glanders, Brucellosis, TB, Pseudo 
Rabies, Classical Swine Fever, ND, IBD, MD, Sheep pox, Anthrax, 
ALV-J & HPPRRS. 
2007 
Slaughter Insp. Prot. for i) Pigs, ii) Poultry, iii) Cattle, iv) 
Sheep/Goats 
2010 
Bee Insp. Prot. 2010 
Insp. Prot. on place of origin for i) Pigs, ii) Ruminants, iii) Poultry, 
iv) Equines 
2010 
Insp. Prot. in place of origin for i) Canines, ii) Felines, iii) Rabbits 2011 
Insp. Prot. in place of origin for i) Fish (trial), ii) Crustaceans (trial), 






entry & exit 
Admin. Meas. for Sampling of Entry & Exit of Ani. & Ani. Products 
for Quar. 
1992 
List A and List B Contagious & Parasitic Dis. for Ani. Imported 
from Other Countries to PRC  
1992 
Admin. Meas. for Interim Isolated Quar.  1996 
Admin. Meas. for Insp. & Quar. of Meat Product Entry & Exit 2002 
Admin. Meas. for Insp. & Quar. of Aquatic Product Entry & Exit 2002 
Admin. Provisions on Risk Analysis of Ani. & Ani. Product Entry 2003 
Admin. Meas. for Approval of Quar. of Entry (Transit) Ani. & Ani. 
Products 
2008 
Data source: Animal Health in China 2011 (VB MoA, 43) 
Abbreviations: Admin.=Administrative, Ani.=Animal, Conting.=Contingency, Dis.=Disease, 
Insp.=Inspection, Manage.=Management, Meas.=Measures, Nat.=National., Prot.=Protocol, 









Pig slaughter                           Cattle slaughter 
  
Sheep and goat slaughter                  Milk production 
  
Poultry slaughter                         Egg production 
  
Figure 1. Distribution of livestock production in China, 2011 
Data source: China Animal Industry Statistics 2011 (National Station of Animal Production, 






Figure 2. Organizational chart of Public Sector Veterinary Services in China 
Source: Animal Health in China 2010 (VB MoA, 44); the number of institution cited from A 
Study on Veterinary Administration System Reform in China (Xiang and Wang, 42) 
Abbreviations: ADCC=Animal Disease Control Center, AQSIQ=General Administration of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, CAHEC= China Animal Health and 
Epidemiology Center, IAHS=Institute of Animal Health Supervision, IVDC=Institute of 




















































Figure 3. China’s Animal Disease Reporting and Surveillance System 
Source: Animal Health in China 2008 (VB, MoA, 48) 
Abbreviations: ADCC= Animal Disease Control Center, ADSRC= Animal Disease Surveillance 













































Figure 4. Organizational Chart for Emergency Response to Major Animal Disease Outbreaks in 
China 
Source: Animal Health in China 2010 (VB MOA, 44) 
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